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Many financing choices of US corporations remain puzzling even after accounting for standard determinants
such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information. We propose that managerial beliefs help
to explain the remaining variation across and within firms, including variation in debt conservatism
and in pecking-order behavior. Managers who believe that their company is undervalued view external
financing as overpriced, especially equity financing. As a result, they display pecking-order preferences
for internal financing over debt and for debt over equity. They may also exhibit debt conservatism:
While they prefer debt to equity, they still underutilize debt relative to its tax benefits. We test these
hypotheses empirically, using late option exercise by the CEO as a measure of overconfidence. We
find that, conditional on accessing public markets, CEOs who personally overinvest in their companies
are significantly less likely to issue equity. They raise 33 cents more debt to cover an additional dollar
of financing deficit than their peers. Moreover, the frequency with which they access any external
finance (debt or equity) is significantly lower, resulting in debt conservatism. The results replicate
when identifying managerial overconfidence based on press portrayal as confident or optimistic. We
conclude that managerial overconfidence helps to explain variation in corporate financial policies.
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The determinants of ﬁnancing decisions in corporations are debated. Traditional theories em-
phasize the trade-oﬀ between tax deductibility of interest payments and bankruptcy costs, or
asymmetric information between ﬁrms and the capital market (Miller (1977), Myers (1984),
Myers and Majluf (1984)). While these theories explain a large part of the observed variation
in capital structure, they cannot explain as easily why ﬁrms with similar fundamentals make
diﬀerent ﬁnancing choices. One explanation for this residual variation is market timing: man-
agers incorporate mispricing due to investor sentiment into their capital structure decisions
(Baker and Wurgler 2002). In this paper, we argue that diﬀerences in managerial beliefs also
explain a signiﬁcant portion of the remaining variation.
We focus on two prominent empirical patterns: the pecking-order of ﬁnancing (Myers
(1984)) and debt conservatism (Graham (2000)).1 We argue that both patterns can be ex-
plained by systematic and measurable diﬀerences in managerial beliefs. In a simple model, we
show that managers with (overly) optimistic views about the future performance of company
stock perceive their ﬁrms to be undervalued by the market and thus view external ﬁnancing
to be unduly costly. As a result, they may display debt conservatism, measured by low levels
of risky debt relative to available interest tax deductions. At the same time, they prefer risky
debt to equity since equity prices are more sensitive to diﬀerences of opinions about future
cash ﬂows. They perceive a larger cost to issuing equity than to issuing debt and no cost to
using internal funds and, thus, adhere to a pecking order of ﬁnancing.
We test these predictions in a panel data set of large U.S. companies. We classify managerial
beliefs using the overconﬁdence measures of Malmendier and Tate (forthcoming) and (2005).
The main measure (“Longholder”) identiﬁes CEOs who systematically maintain high exposure
to company-speciﬁc risk in their personal portfolios. The CEOs in our data have a strong
incentive to diversify their holdings since they receive substantial equity-based compensation
and the value of their human capital depends on ﬁrm performance. Yet, some CEOs hold
non-tradeable, in-the-money executive stock options until expiration rather than exercising
them after the vesting period. This personal investment is not explained by insider knowledge,
as it does not yield abnormal returns over a simple strategy of exercising and diversifying. A
1Frank and Goyal (2007a) survey the large literature on the causes and importance of these patterns.
1plausible interpretation is that these CEOs overestimate the means of their ﬁrms’ future cash-
ﬂows.2 We address several alternative interpretations, including signaling and risk tolerance,
and separate years before and after a CEO’s ﬁrst late exercise (“Pre-” and “Post-Longholder”).
We also identify CEOs who do not exercise options which are highly in the money (67%) ﬁve
years prior to expiration (“Holder 67”).3 As a robustness check, we identify CEOs’ beliefs
b a s e do nt h e i rp o r t r a y a la s“ c o n ﬁdent” or “optimistic” in the business press.
We relate these measures of managerial beliefs to corporate ﬁnancial policies. Using SDC
data on security issuance, we ﬁnd that CEOs with overly positive beliefs are signiﬁcantly less
likely to issue equity, conditional on accessing public markets. We ﬁnd the same pattern using
accounting data from Compustat, which includes private ﬁnancing, and the methodology of
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999): CEOs with optimistic beliefs raise roughly 33 cents more
debt than their peers to cover an additional dollar of external ﬁnancing required to meet current
cash commitments. Next, we test whether overconﬁdent CEOs’ reluctance to access external
capital markets leads to debt conservatism. Using the methodology from Graham (2000), we
ﬁnd that CEOs with optimistic beliefs are signiﬁcantly more likely to under-utilize debt relative
to the tax beneﬁts. While they do not abstain from issuing riskless debt (for which there is
no disagreement about the appropriate interest rate), they are more conservative than their
peers when they have intermediate S&P debt ratings. Among overconﬁdent CEOs, the most
debt-conservative CEOs are also least likely to issue equity. Finally, we ﬁnd some evidence
that the history of managerial beliefs is related to long-term changes in capital structure: the
longer the period a ﬁrm has had overconﬁdent CEOs, the higher is the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio.
Our ﬁndings show the importance of managerial characteristics–in this case, beliefs about
future returns–for ﬁnancing decisions. The distinction between diﬀerent types of managers
allows us to explain otherwise puzzling capital-structure variation within ﬁrms and between
similar ﬁrms. By allowing for incorrect beliefs among a subset of managers, we decouple
observed pecking-order choices from the presence of real inside information.
Our analysis rests on two important simpliﬁcations. First, we restrict the theoretical analy-
2Under-estimation of the variance (rather than mean) of cash ﬂows, which is also sometimes referred to as
‘overconﬁdence’ in the ﬁnance literature, would reduce option value and predict early rather than late exercise.
Thus, our measures do not capture this form of mistaken beliefs.
3The 67% threshold comes from the rational option exercise model of Hall and Liebman (2002) with constant
relative risk aversion of 3 and 67% of wealth in company stock.
2sis to one period and one non-scalable investment project. In a dynamic model with scalable
investment, overconﬁdent CEOs may maintain excess debt capacity to ﬁnance future invest-
ment, reinforcing debt conservatism. On the other hand, the overestimation of returns to
investment may induce them to scale-up current projects, reversing debt conservatism. Since
we ﬁnd that debt conservatism dominates empirically, we focus on modeling this eﬀect.
Second, our empirical analysis identiﬁes the beliefs of CEOs, but not of CFOs, for whom we
do not have data on personal characteristics and portfolio choices.4 As a result, our ﬁndings
allow for two interpretations: (1) CEO beliefs directly determine ﬁnancing, and (2) CFOs
determine ﬁnancing, but their decisions are positively correlated with CEO beliefs. It is likely,
however, that CEOs make the ultimate ﬁnancing decisions. While the role of CFOs in ﬁnancing
decisions is important, the CEO alone can withdraw a stock oﬀering at the last moment
(Hechinger (1998)) or overrule the CFO and treasurer (Whitford (1999)).5
Our results also ﬁll a critical gap in the literature on managerial overconﬁdence, initiated
by Roll (1986).6 Preferences among diﬀerent ﬁnancing instruments are an implicit predic-
tion in much of the literature, yet, to our knowledge, remain untested using ﬁeld data from
corporations. This paper links CEO overconﬁdence directly to ﬁnancing in large U.S. ﬁrms.
Our results contribute to the large capital-structure literature testing pecking-order and
trade-oﬀ theories. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), for example, argue that the tendency of
ﬁrms to ﬁll ﬁnancing deﬁcits with new debt rather than equity issues supports the pecking-
order theory over a static trade-oﬀ model. Frank and Goyal (2003) use the same empirical
methodology on an extended sample of ﬁrms to argue in favor of the trade-oﬀ model. Fama
and French (2002) ﬁnd evidence that contradicts both theories. These results leave room
to explore other determinants of ﬁnancing decisions. Our analysis of manager-speciﬁce ﬀects
neither contradicts nor conﬁrms traditional theories, but allows us to explain residual variation
in ﬁnancing choices over traditional market, industry, and ﬁrm-level determinants.
Our results also build upon a large social psychology literature on the “better than av-
4Using ExecuComp data on the top ﬁve executives in S&P 1500 ﬁrms, one could construct similar measures.
However, the data is not as detailed, often missing for CFOs, and available for a shorter time frame.
5It is not unusual that a ﬁnancing plan proposed by the CFO is disapproved by the CEO, especially when
sales of assets are involved (Millman (2001)). Recent jury verdicts against CEOs of ﬁrms with ﬁnancial scandals
imply the same point of view.
6See the survey by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2006). Recent work includes Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson
(2003); Landier and Thesmar (forthcoming); Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) and the literature reviewed below.
3erage” eﬀect and overconﬁdence.7 Executives appear to be particularly prone to display
overconﬁdence.8 One reason may be sorting of high-conﬁdence individuals into top corpo-
rate positions (Goel and Thakor, forthcoming). In addition, self-attribution bias may enhance
the conﬁdence of individuals who achieve the string of successes necessary to attain a CEO
position (Miller and Ross, 1975). Finally, CEOs face exactly the kind of environment that in-
vites overconﬁdence: they are the most powerful executives in their ﬁrms, potentially inducing
“illusion of control;” they are highly committed to good outcomes; and the reference points
for success are rather abstract, making it hard to compare performance across individuals.9
Finally, there is a growing literature linking managerial beliefs to ﬁnancing choices. Jenter
(2004) shows that CEOs are net sellers of stock when book-to-market ratios are low, suggest-
ing a belief that their ﬁrms are overvalued. This evidence, combined with Baker and Wurgler
(2002), connects CEO beliefs to ﬁnancing choices and emphasizes the arbitrage role of rational
managers in ineﬃcient equity markets. We build instead on the literature considering biased
managerial beliefs in an eﬃcient market. Heaton (2002) models the ﬁnancing choices of opti-
mistic CEOs. Hackbarth (forthcoming) incorporates optimism and overconﬁdence in a model of
corporate borrowing and shows that these biases help to overcome conﬂicts between managers
and shareholders related to debt overhang, such as underinvestment and diversion of funds.
Empirically, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2007b) show that managerial
traits matter for ﬁnancial policy. Graham and Harvey’s (2001) CFO Outlook Survey suggests
a direct role for biased managerial beliefs. In the second quarter of 1999, prior to the end of
the technology bubble, roughly 70% of the survey respondents state that their company stock
is undervalued, and 67% say that misvaluation is an important factor in the decision to issue
stock. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) relate the mis-calibration of CFOs revealed
in such surveys to a wide range of corporate decisions, including corporate ﬁnancing. Finally,
Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that the investment decisions of overconﬁdent managers
are more sensitive to cash-ﬂow, particularly among ﬁrms with low debt capacity. However, the
7Larwood and Whittaker (1977), Svenson (1981), and Alicke (1985) show that individuals appear to overstate
their skills relative to the average of a reference group. The eﬀect extends to economic decision-making in
experiments (Camerer and Lovallo (1999)).
8Larwood and Whittaker (1977); Kidd (1970); Moore (1977).
9Weinstein (1980); Alicke et al. (1995). March and Shapira (1987) and Langer (1975) ﬁnd that CEOs believe
they can control ﬁrm outcomes and tend to underestimate the likelihood of failure.
4preference for internal over external ﬁnancing — which drives the investment results — is not
directly tested. This shortcoming leaves the results open to alternative interpretations and to
concerns about the endogeneity of investment regressions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a model that
relates corporate ﬁnancing decisions to managerial beliefs. Section 3 describes the data and the
construction of the key dependent variables. Section 4 describes our overconﬁdence measures.
Section 5 tests the eﬀects of overconﬁdence on ﬁnancing policy. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
We provide a simple framework that relates managerial beliefs to two questions in the capital
structure literature: First, why are managers averse to accessing the external capital market,
resulting in debt levels that are low relative to available tax beneﬁts? Second, why do (some)
managers follow a pecking order of ﬁnancing? The model allows for taxes and bankruptcy costs,
but abstracts from other market frictions such as risk aversion, agency costs, or asymmetric
information. The latter factors do not change the predictions as long as they aﬀect managers
uniformly and are not suﬃcient to create boundary solutions (e.g. full debt ﬁnancing for a
rational CEO).
We model the decision of a manager to undertake and ﬁnance an investment project with
cost I and stochastic return e R,g i v e nb yRG with probability p ∈ (0;1) and RB with probability
1 − p,w h e r eRG >I>R B.T h eﬁrm pays taxes at marginal rate τ on the net return e R − I
if e R>I . The cost and the return distribution are common knowledge. We assume perfectly
competitive debt and equity markets and normalize the risk-free interest rate to zero. The ﬁrm
has existing assets A and internal funds C. The CEO maximizes the perceived value of the
c o m p a n yt oe x i s t i n gs h a r e h o l d e r s . 10 We allow for the possibility that the CEO overestimates
(after-tax) project returns, ˆ E[ ˜ R −τ1{R>I}( ˜ R−I)] >E [ ˜ R−τ1{R>I}( ˜ R −I)], and the value of
assets in place, b A>A .
We ﬁrst consider the unconditional choice between internal ﬁnancing (i.e. using cash and
riskless debt, denoted by c ≤ C) and equity.
10Note that a CEO who maximizes value to current shareholders would never buy back shares since it is a
zero-sum game: Some current shareholders are helped at the expense of other current shareholders.
5Proposition 1 Overconﬁdent CEOs strictly prefer internal ﬁnance to equity and use weakly
more internal ﬁnancing than rational CEOs.
Proof. See Appendix.
Overconﬁdent CEOs perceive the price for new issues to be too low since they believe
markets underestimate future cash ﬂows. Proposition 1 immediately extends from equity to
risky debt if the CEO overestimates cash ﬂows in the default state (RB): Since he overestimates
cash ﬂows going to creditors, he perceives interest payments on debt to be too high. Thus,
overconﬁdent CEOs have a strict preference for internal ﬁnancing over risky debt or equity
and exhaust cash reserves and riskless debt capacity before issuing risky securities.
To complete the pecking order, we analyze the choice between risky debt and equity, con-
ditional on accessing external capital markets. To simplify the analysis, we set other assets
including cash equal to zero, b A = A = C = 0. (We will re-introduce assets and cash below.)
Conditional on implementing the project and exhausting all riskless debt capacity created




ˆ E[( ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I − [w − d]) − w)+]( 1 )
s.t.
s0
s + s0E[( ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I − [w − d]) − w)+]=I − d (2)
E[min{w, ˜ R − L}]=d (3)
RB ≤ d ≤ I (4)
where s is the number of shares outstanding, s0 the number of newly issued shares, w the
face value of debt, d the market value of debt, and L the deadweight loss from bankruptcy.
Interest payments w − d are tax deductible. The CEO maximizes the perceived expected
returns accruing to current shareholders after subtracting taxes and repaying debt, if any.
Constraints (2) and (3) are the participation constraints for new shareholders and lenders,
respectively. Note that the compensation required for equity and debt ﬁnancing depends on
investors’ unbiased beliefs rather than managerial perception.
The following Proposition characterizes the ﬁnancing choice of rational CEOs ( ˆ E[·]=E[·]):
Proposition 2 Rational CEOs ﬁnance the risky portion of investment, I − RB,u s i n go n l y
risky debt if the tax beneﬁts are high relative to bankruptcy costs,
τ(I−RB)
1−τ >L . They use only
equity if the tax beneﬁts are low relative to bankruptcy costs,
τ(I−RB)





If a CEO chooses to raise debt, it is optimal to set the debt level as high as possible since
tax beneﬁts are increasing in the amount of debt while bankruptcy costs are ﬁxed. If the
CEO chooses full equity ﬁnancing, he avoids bankruptcy costs, but gives up the tax beneﬁts
of debt. The optimum, then, is either full debt or full equity ﬁnancing, depending on whether
the expected tax beneﬁts, τp(w − d), outweigh expected bankruptcy costs, (1 − p)L.11
Now consider a CEO who overestimates the returns to investment, ˆ E[·] >E [·]. Speciﬁcally,
assume that the CEO overestimates returns by a ﬁxed amount ∆ in the good state, ˆ RG =
RG + ∆, but correctly perceives returns in the bad state, ˆ RB = RB. This assumption allows
us to isolate the mechanism which generates a preference for risky debt: over-valuation of the
residual claim on cash ﬂows in the good state. (After stating the next Proposition, we will
return to a discussion of more general forms of return overestimation.)
Proposition 3 Overconﬁdent CEOs choose full debt ﬁnancing more often than rational CEOs.
Proof. See Appendix.
An overconﬁdent CEO is more likely to choose full debt ﬁnancing than a rational CEO
for two reasons. First, the CEO overestimates the tax beneﬁts of debt since he overestimates
future returns (i.e., overestimates cash ﬂow RG by ∆). Second, he perceives equity ﬁnancing
to be more costly since new shareholders obtain a partial claim on ∆.
In our simple set-up, the CEO agrees with the market about the fair interest rate on risky
debt since there is no disagreement about the probability of default or the cash ﬂow in default
states. Overconﬁdence also does not aﬀect the decision to implement a project. Even though
overconﬁdent CEOs overvalue projects, they invest eﬃciently since capital markets do not
ﬁnance negative net present value projects. Hence, overconﬁdent CEOs destroy value ‘only’
by using risky debt in some cases in which equity would be cheaper. If we re-introduce A
or C,o v e r c o n ﬁdent CEOs may over-invest since they can ﬁnance negative net present value
projects by diluting A or spending out of C. Likewise, if we allow for CEOs to perceive b A>A ,
overconﬁdent CEOs might under-invest due to concern over diluting claims on existing assets.12
11In the simple two-state setup, the optimal capital structure never includes both risky debt and equity.
Interior leverage choices become optimal if we add an intermediate state in which the ﬁrm may or may not
default depending on the level of debt chosen.
12Propositions 1 and 2 of Malmendier and Tate (2004) derive these results formally in a parallel setup.
7Finally, we consider other forms of return overestimation. First, suppose that the CEO
overestimates p rather than RG. In this case, the CEO also overestimates the returns to invest-
ment, but views equity and risky debt to be equally unattractive: the perceived cost of debt
fully incorporates under-estimation of the probability of default, and all claimholders demand
equal compensation to provide a dollar of ﬁnancing. Second, consider a CEO who overesti-
mates not only RG but also RB,e . g . ˆ RB = RB + ∆. If ˆ RB ≥ w ≥ RB,o v e r c o n ﬁdent CEOs
mistakenly believe that they will not default in the bad state. If the probability of default
is large and ∆ is small, the CEO may misperceive debt ﬁnancing to be costlier than equity
ﬁnancing, reversing the preference for risky debt over equity. Hence, Proposition 3 does not
hold in all cases. Intuitively, creditors seize all of ∆ in the event of default on risky debt, but
equity holders receive only a fraction of ∆ in the bad state.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates that overconﬁdence can generate a preference for risky
debt over equity, conditional on accessing external capital markets. This preference arises
because overconﬁdent CEOs prefer being the residual claimant on the full cash ﬂow in non-
default states to giving up a fraction of cash ﬂows in all states. In addition, overconﬁdent CEOs
may exhibit debt conservatism. They raise little external ﬁnancing of any kind, in particular
less risky debt than rational CEOs. In other words, the absolute amount of debt used by
overconﬁdent CEOs may be smaller even if leverage is higher, as illustrated in Figure 1. To
summarize, the theory generates the following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Conditional on accessing external ﬁnancing (and conditional on a given
ﬁnancing deﬁcit), overconﬁdent CEOs issue more debt than rational CEOs.
Hypothesis 2. Unconditionally, overconﬁd e n tC E O si s s u ed e b tm o r ec o n s e r v a t i v e l yt h a n
CEOs who are not overconﬁdent.
3D a t a
To measure CEO beliefs about future stock performance, we use data on CEOs’ personal in-
vestments from Hall and Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995). The data details the stock
ownership and set of option packages — including exercise price, remaining duration, and num-
ber of underlying shares — for the CEOs of 477 publicly-traded U.S. ﬁrms between 1980 and
1994 year by year. The sample focuses on large companies: All ﬁrms appear at least four times
8on one of the Forbes magazine lists of largest US companies between 1984 and 1994. The sam-
ple selection is important since Frank and Goyal (2003) ﬁnd systematic diﬀerences between
the ﬁnancing choices of small and large companies. Our results are primarily applicable to
large ﬁrms. However, our results may generalize to small ﬁrms, since our tests focus on the
interaction of overconﬁdence and ﬁnancing rather than the average ﬁnancing decision itself.
As an alternative way to measure CEO beliefs, we use their portrayal in the business press.
We hand-collect annual data on the press coverage of our sample CEOs in The Wall Street
Journal, The New York Times, Business Week, Financial Times, and The Economist.W e
count the total number of articles referring to the CEO and the subsets using the words “con-
ﬁdent” or “conﬁdence;” “optimistic” or “optimism;” and “reliable,” “cautious,” “practical,”
“frugal,” “conservative,” or “steady.” We hand-check each article to ensure that the adjectives
are used to describe the CEO and to determine whether they are negated. We also collect
detailed information on the context of each reference. For example, we record whether the
article is about the CEO, the ﬁrm, or the market or industry as a whole and, if the article is
about the ﬁrm, the speciﬁc policies it references (earnings, products, mergers, culture).
We merge this CEO-level data with information on public security issues from Thomson’s
SDC Platinum database. We include all U.S. new issues of common stock, convertible debt,
convertible preferred stock, non-convertible debt, and non-convertible preferred stock. We also
include U.S. Rule 144A issues of these securities. To capture the impact of loans and other
forms of private debt on ﬁnancing choices, we use COMPUSTAT cash ﬂow statement data to
construct alternative measures of debt and equity issuance. We measure net debt issuance as
the diﬀerence between long-term debt issuance (item 111) and long-term debt reduction (item
114). We measure net equity issuance as the diﬀerence between sales of common stock (item
108) and stock repurchases (item 115). Long-term debt reduction and stock repurchases are
set to zero if they are missing or combined with other data items. We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms
(SIC codes 6000 - 6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) from our analysis.
We also construct the net ﬁnancing deﬁcit to capture the amount of ﬁnancing the CEO has
to raise through either debt or equity issues in a given ﬁrm year:
FDt =D I V t +I t + ∆Wt − Ct
DIV is cash dividends; I net investment (capital expenditures + increase in investments +
acquisitions + other uses of funds - sale of PPE - sale of investment);13 ∆W is change in
13For ﬁrms reporting format codes 1 to 3, net investment is items 128 + 113 + 129 + 219 - 107 - 109; for
9working capital (change in operating working capital + change in cash and cash equivalents +
change in current debt);14 and C cash ﬂow after interest and taxes (income before extraordinary
items + depreciation and amortization + extraordinary items and discontinued operations +
deferred taxes + equity in net loss (earnings) + other funds from operations + gain (loss) from
sales of PPE and other investments).15 All deﬁnitions follow Frank and Goyal (2003). We use
the value of book assets (item 6) taken at the beginning of the ﬁscal year to normalize debt
and equity issuance and the ﬁnancing deﬁcit.
We also use COMPUSTAT to construct several ﬁrm level control variables. We measure Q
as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Market value of assets is deﬁned
as book value of total assets (item 6) plus market equity minus book equity. Market equity
is deﬁned as common shares outstanding (item 25) times ﬁscal year closing price (item 199).
Book equity is calculated as stockholders’ equity (item 216) [or the ﬁrst available of common
equity (item 60) plus preferred stock par value (item 130) or total assets (item 6) minus total
liabilities (item 181)] minus preferred stock liquidating value (item 10) [or the ﬁrst available
of redemption value (item 56) or par value (item 130)] plus balance sheet deferred taxes and
investment tax credit (item 35) when available minus post retirement assets (item 330) when
available. Book value of assets is total assets (item 6).16 We measure proﬁtability using
operating income before depreciation (item 13) and asset tangibility using property, plants
and equipment (item 8). We normalize both variables using the book value of assets at the
beginning of the ﬁscal year. We measure book leverage as the quantity debt in current liabilities
(data 34) plus long term debt (item 9) divided by the quantity debt in current liabilities (data
34) plus long term debt (item 9) plus common equity (item 60).
Finally, we use the “kink” variable, provided by John Graham. The construction of this
variable and the associated control variables are described in Graham (2000).17 The kink vari-
ﬁrms reporting format code 7, it is items 128 + 113 + 129 - 107 - 109 - 309 - 310. When items are missing or
c o m b i n e dw i t ho t h e ri t e m s ,w ec o d et h e ma s0 .
14For format code 1, this is items 236 + 274 + 301; for codes 2 and 3, −236 + 274 − 301; for code 7, −302 −
303 − 304 − 305 − 307 + 274 − 312 − 301. All items, excluding item 274, are replaced with 0 when missing or
combined with other items.
15For codes 1 to 3, this is items 123 + 124 + 125 + 126 + 106 + 213 + 217 + 218. For code 7, this is items
123+124+125+126+106+213+217+314. Items are coded as 0 when missing or combined with other items.
16Deﬁnitions of Q and its components as in Fama and French (2002).
17See Table 1 for more detail. Following Graham (2000), all continuous controls in the kink regressions are
10able captures the amount of additional debt ﬁrms could issue before the marginal beneﬁto f
interest deductions begins to decline. When a ﬁrm is committed to low future interest pay-
ments, all of the interest payments are likely to be deducted from future proﬁts and the tax
beneﬁts are equal to the interest payment times the marginal corporate tax rate. As debt levels
and future interest payments increase, it becomes increasingly likely that the company cannot
generate enough proﬁts to fully realize the interest tax shield. Consequently, the expected
marginal tax beneﬁt is decreasing when an additional dollar of interest payment is commit-
ted. The kink is deﬁned as the ratio of the hypothetical interest level at which the expected
marginal beneﬁts start to fall (numerator) to the actual amount of interest paid by the ﬁrm
(denominator). Assuming the marginal cost of debt intersects the downward-sloping portion
of the marginal beneﬁt curve, a kink greater than 1 indicates that the ﬁrm has “left money
on the table.” The potential gain from adding debt increases with the kink. In this sense,
high-kink ﬁrms use debt more conservatively.
The left columns of Table 1 present the summary statistics after excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and utilities (Full Sample; 263 ﬁrms). Panel A shows the COMPUSTAT data and the distri-
bution across the 12 Fama and French industries.18 Panel B summarizes the variable kink
and the control variables used in the kink regressions. In the latter analysis, the sample is
reduced to 189 ﬁrms due to missing values of the controls required in the kink analysis. Panel
C summarizes CEO characteristics and Table 2 summarizes SDC security issues.
4O v e r c o n ﬁdence Measures
4.1 Portfolio and Press Measures
We take two approaches to identify CEO beliefs. First, we infer CEOs’ “revealed beliefs” from
their decisions to exercise or hold non-tradeable company stock options. Our measures exploit
the incentive to exercise options early due to underdiversiﬁcation. CEOs in our sample receive
large grants of company stock and options as compensation. In addition, their human capital is
invested in their ﬁrms, so that bad ﬁrm performance also reduces their outside options. Due to
their high exposure to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies, they should generally exercise
winsorized at the 1% level.
18For deﬁnitions see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
11their executive options early. The exact exercise schedule depends on individual wealth, risk-
aversion and diversiﬁcation (Hall and Murphy (2002)). If CEOs overestimate future returns
of their ﬁrm, however, they may hold in-the-money options beyond rational thresholds for
exercise in order to personally beneﬁt from expected stock price appreciation. Malmendier
and Tate (forthcoming) translate this logic into three measures of overconﬁdence. We use the
same measures, which allows us to interpret our results within the context of previous ﬁndings.
Longholder. Longholder is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for all CEOs who ever
hold an option until the year of expiration even though the option is at least 40 percent in the
money entering its ﬁnal year. The exercise threshold of 40 percent corresponds to constant
relative risk aversion of 3 and 67 percent of wealth in company stock in the rational option
exercise model of Hall and Murphy (2002). The threshold removes the (rare) cases in which
the decision to hold to expiration is easily rationalizable, such as underwater options.
The Longholder measure is a managerial ﬁxed eﬀect. The remaining measures allow for
variation within the CEO’s tenure.
Pre-Longholder / Post-Longholder. Post-Longholder is a dummy variable equal to 1 only
after the CEO for the ﬁrst time holds an option until expiration (provided it exceeds the
40 percent threshold). Pre-Longholder is equal to 1 for the rest of the CEO years where
Longholder is equal to 1. Post-Longholder, then, allows us to isolate ﬁnancing decisions after
the CEO has revealed his conﬁdence level.
Holder 67. To construct Holder 67, we consider all option holdings with ﬁve years remain-
ing duration. Maintaining the previous assumptions on constant relative risk aversion and
diversiﬁcation, the new exercise threshold (in the Hall-Murphy framework) is 67 percent in the
money. Holder 67 is a binary variable equal to 1 if a CEO fails to exercise options with 5 years
remaining duration despite a 67 percent increase in stock price (or more) since the grant date.
When we apply this measure, we restrict the comparison group to CEOs who were faced with
this exercise decision, but chose to exercise rather than hold: A CEO enters the sample once
he has an option with 5 years remaining duration that is at least 67 percent in the money.
Once a CEO decides to postpone the exercise of such an option he receives a value of 1 under
Holder 67 and retains that value for the remainder of his sample years.
Our second approach to measuring CEO beliefs uses characterizations in the business press.
Our press data, described in Section 3, provides the number of articles year-by-year that refer
12to each sample CEO using the terms (a)“ c o n ﬁdent” or “conﬁdence,” (b) “optimistic” or
“optimism,” (c)“ c o n ﬁdent,” but in a negated form (d) “optimistic,” but in a negated form
and (e) “reliable,” “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,” “frugal,” or “steady.” For each
sample year, we compare the number of past articles that portray the CEO as conﬁdent and
optimistic to the number of past articles that portray him as not conﬁdent, not optimistic,
reliable, cautious, conservative, practical, frugal, or steady. We deﬁne the following indicator
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We only use past media portrayal to ensure that ﬁnancing policies do not aﬀect the press
measure directly. We also hand-check the context of the individual articles and ﬁnd few articles
about ﬁnancial policy: Among the 960 articles primarily about the ﬁrm, 53% focus on company
earnings, 17% on mergers, and fewer than 5% on ﬁnancial policy.
It is possible that diﬀerential coverage could bias our TOTALconﬁdent measure. If, for
example, there is a press bias towards positive news stories, CEOs who are often in the press
w o u l db em o r el i k e l yt oh a v eT O T A L c o n ﬁdent equal to 1. To address this possibility, we
control for total mentions in the selected publications, aggregated over the same period as the
TOTALconﬁdent measure, whenever we utilize the measure.
In the right-hand columns of Table 1, we show ﬁrm and CEO summary statistics for the
subsample of Longholder ﬁrm years. The sample characteristics are similar using the other
measures of overconﬁdence. Moreover, the overconﬁdence measures are all positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated with each other.
4.2 Alternative Interpretations
We consider several alternative interpretations of our measures. We exclude explanations for
late option exercise that have little or no bearing on the press measure. For example, personal
taxes, board pressure and procrastination are potential explanations for late option exercise,
but have no plausible eﬀect on CEOs’ portrayal in the business press. To address these stories,
we rely on the robustness of our results across the two measures.
Inside Information. CEOs may choose not to exercise in-the-money options because they
have private information that the ﬁrm’s future earnings will be strong. Then, holding company
13stock options is a proﬁtable investment opportunity until outsiders learn the information and
incorporate it into prices. Moreover, CEOs with such information may justiﬁably exude “con-
ﬁdence” and “optimism” to outsiders, including the business press. In this case, our results
would support the traditional information-based explanation of pecking order ﬁnancing. The
key distinction between this story and overconﬁdence is whether CEOs’ beliefs are correct.
We check whether CEOs earn positive abnormal returns from holding options beyond the
calibrated thresholds. We ﬁnd that Longholder CEOs would earn greater proﬁts on average
by exercising 1, 2, 3, or 4 years earlier and investing in the S&P 500 for the remainder of the
options’ durations.19 We ﬁnd similar evidence for the Holder 67 measure. Thus, the evidence
suggests that the average CEO who holds company stock options beyond calibrated thresholds
for exercise does not have positive inside information.
Signalling. The apparent absence of inside information makes a rational signalling inter-
pretation of our measures diﬃcult. If late option exercise and bold statements to the press are
signals of strong future stock price performance, those signals seem ineﬀective: CEOs who send
them are the least likely to issue equity and their stock does not display positive abnormal
performance. On the other hand, investors might have expected worse future performance in
the absence of option-holding and strong statements in the press, leading to even less equity
issuance. Our ﬁndings using the Post-Longholder measure cast some doubt on this interpre-
tation. If private information drives managerial ﬁnancing preferences for debt over equity and
delayed option exercise (and press coverage) signals that information to the market, we would
expect a weaker impact of past ‘signals.’ Instead, we ﬁnd little diﬀerence between the eﬀects
of past and contemporaneous late exercise on ﬁnancing choices.
Risk Tolerance. CEOs with greater risk tolerance may hold options longer since they are
more willing to expose their personal wealth to company-speciﬁc risk. They may also appear
more “conﬁdent” and “optimistic” and less “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,” “reliable,”
or “steady” to business reporters. In addition, bankruptcy is less of a deterrent to issuing debt
for risk-seeking CEOs. However, risk tolerance does not predict aversion to external ﬁnancing.
Thus, our debt conservatism results in Section 5.2 will be diﬃcult to reconcile with this story.
Thus, each of these interpretations is diﬃcult to reconcile with some of the evidence. Over-
estimation of future performance, instead, is consistent with all of our ﬁndings. For the remain-
19See Malmendier and Tate (2004) for detailed tables.
14der of the paper, we interpret Longholder, Holder 67, and TOTALconﬁdent as overconﬁdence
measures. The main insight, however, is independent of this interpretation: systematic and
measurable diﬀerences between CEOs predict systematic diﬀerences in ﬁnancial policies.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Debt versus Equity
Overconﬁdent managers are reluctant to issue equity because they believe that it dilutes the
claims of existing shareholders. Debt, instead, allows current shareholders to remain the resid-
ual claimant on the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows. As a result, overconﬁdent CEOs generally prefer
debt to equity. We test whether, conditional on accessing public securities markets, overcon-
ﬁdent CEOs are less likely to issue equity (Hypothesis 1). We repeat the test in the standard
‘ﬁnancing deﬁcit’ framework (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)), which extends the analysis
to include private debt and accounts explicitly for the amount of outside ﬁnancing (debt or
equity) the ﬁrm has to raise to cover ﬁnancing needs.
5.1.1 Speciﬁcation 1: Public Issues
Table 2 presents the frequencies of equity and debt issues, conditional on conducting a public
issue. The test of Hypothesis 1 requires us to condition on accessing public markets, since over-
conﬁdent and non-overconﬁdent CEOs may access public markets with diﬀerent frequencies.
Y e a r sw i t hb o t had e b ta n da ne q u i t yi s s u ec o u n ti nb o t hc a t e g o r i e s .
We ﬁnd that the frequency of equity issuance is lower for overconﬁdent CEOs under all
of our measures. For Longholder CEOs, 31% of ﬁrm years with public issues contain at least
one equity issue. This percentage is virtually constant across Pre- and Post- Longholder years.
When Longholder is 0, instead, 42% of issue years contain an equity issue. The diﬀerence
between the frequency of Longholder and non-Longholder equity issues is statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level, where standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm level. The
results are stronger, both economically and statistically, using the Holder 67 and TOTALcon-
ﬁdent measures. Holder 67 CEOs issue equity 23% of the time, but CEOs in the comparison
group issue equity 39% of the time. TOTALconﬁdent CEOs issue equity 25% of the time, but
CEOs for whom TOTALconﬁdent is 0 issue equity 48% of the time. For both measures, the
15diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, again adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm level.
Overconﬁdent CEOs also issue debt at a higher frequency than other CEOs. Under all mea-
sures, the percentage of issuance years with at least one debt issue is higher for overconﬁdent
CEOs than in the comparison group. However, the diﬀerence is only statistically signiﬁcant
using the TOTALconﬁdent measure. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for hybrid securities.
We test whether these cross-sectional patterns are robust to the inclusion of CEO- and
ﬁrm-level controls in a logit model. The dependent variable is an indicator of at least one
equity issue during the ﬁscal year. We ﬁrst run a baseline logit with overconﬁdence as the only
explanatory variable. We then add portfolio controls for the incentive eﬀects of performance-
based compensation: the percentage of company stock and the number of vested options held
by the CEO. Options are scaled by shares outstanding and multiplied by 10 so that the mean is
comparable to the mean of stock holdings. Finally, we add the standard controls from the cap-
ital structure literature — the natural logarithm of sales, proﬁtability, tangibility, Q, and book
leverage — to capture the eﬀects of known cross-sectional determinants of changes in leverage
(Rajan and Zingales (1995)).20 Leverage is a particularly important control as it captures sys-
tematic diﬀerences in the ability to (further) access debt markets. Finally, we add year eﬀects
to control for the possibility that overconﬁdent CEO-years are disproportionately clustered in
cold markets for equity issuance. All control variables are measured at the beginning of the
ﬁscal year and all standard errors are adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering.
In Table 3, we present these estimations using the Longholder measure. Similar to the
pattern in the raw data, Longholder CEOs are 37 − 45% less likely than other CEOs to issue
equity across all speciﬁcations. The estimated eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 5% or 10% levels.
Among the controls, we ﬁnd that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to issue equity. Large vested
option holdings increase the odds of issuing equity, though the large coeﬃcient estimate is
driven by 5 outlier observations in the upper tail of the distribution. Eliminating those ob-
servations substantially decreases the coeﬃcient without aﬀecting the Longholder coeﬃcient.
One surprising result is that Q does not seem to positively predict equity issues. In an untabu-
lated estimation, however, we ﬁnd that stock returns over the prior year predict a signiﬁcantly
higher probability of issuing equity without materially aﬀecting the Longholder estimate.
20When we use book leverage as a control, we drop the small number of observations for which book leverage
is greater than 1.
16We ﬁnd similar results using the Holder 67 and TOTALconﬁdent measures. The measured
impact on equity issuance is stronger economically and statistically than the Longholder results
in all cases but one. The one exception is the estimation including all controls and year eﬀects
with TOTALconﬁdent as the overconﬁdence measure (odds ratio = 72%; p-value = 0.18).
There are also no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the Pre- and Post-Longholder portions of the
Longholder eﬀect. All results are robust to alternative sets of controls; for example, including
changes in sales, Q, proﬁtability, or tangibility either in addition to or in lieu of the levels
has little impact on the results. Finally, as in Table 2, we do not ﬁnd consistently signiﬁcant
results when we use either debt or hybrid issuance as the dependent variable.
Overall, CEOs we classify as overconﬁdent are less likely to issue equity conditional on
accessing public securities markets, controlling for standard determinants of issuance decisions.
5.1.2 Speciﬁcation 2: Financing Deﬁcit
We also consider the debt versus equity choice in the ‘ﬁnancing deﬁcit framework’ of Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), using data from cash ﬂow statements. This data adds bank loans
and other private sources of ﬁnancing to the analysis and allows us to use the full sample, rather
than only years with a public security issuance. One immediate advantage of the larger sample
is that we can include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e., identify the impact of overconﬁdence separately
from time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀects. Moreover, the ﬁnancing-deﬁcit framework is particularly well-
suited to test Hypothesis 1 since it conditions on the CEO’s choice to raise external ﬁnance.
We test whether overconﬁdent CEOs cover more of their ﬁnancing deﬁcits using debt than
equity. The ‘ﬁnancing deﬁcit’ measures the amount of expenditures requiring external ﬁnance.
This approach is analogous to conditioning on public security issuance in Section 5.1.1. Over-
conﬁdent CEOs may raise more funds than rational CEOs (since they overestimate the returns
to investment) or fewer funds (since they perceive external ﬁnancing to be overpriced). Thus,
rather than asking whether overconﬁdent CEOs raise more dollars of debt or fewer dollars of
equity than their peers, we test whether the mix of external ﬁnance depends on overconﬁdence.
We use the following regression speciﬁcation:
Debtit = β1 + β2FDit + X0
itB3 + β4∆it + FDit · X0
itB5 + β6FDit · ∆it +  it (5)
FD denotes the ﬁnancing deﬁcit (deﬁned in Section 3), and ∆ is the overconﬁdence proxy.
The set X includes CEO- and ﬁrm-level controls. At the CEO level, we control for stock
17ownership and vested options (as in Table 3). At the ﬁrm level, we use the controls from
Frank and Goyal (2003): book leverage and changes in proﬁtability, tangibility, the natural
logarithm of sales, and Q. All controls are included both as level eﬀects and interacted with
FD. We also include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and their interactions with FD.T h eﬁxed eﬀects allow
us to separate eﬀects we attribute to the CEO from time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀects. In the case of
Holder 67 and TOTALconﬁdent, we also exploit variation between a CEO’s overconﬁdent and
non-overconﬁdent years. Finally, we include year eﬀects to control for the eﬀects of hot equity
issuance markets. All standard errors account for clustering at the ﬁrm level.
Table 4 presents the results of estimating (5) using Longholder as the overconﬁdence proxy.
Column 1 presents a baseline regression without ﬁxed eﬀects or controls for comparison to
prior literature. The coeﬃcient of roughly 0.73 on the ﬁnancing deﬁcit is very close to the
eﬀect estimated in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), reﬂecting that our sample of large ﬁrms
is more similar to their sample than to the Frank and Goyal (2003) sample.21
In Column 2, we add Longholder, its interaction with the ﬁnancing deﬁcit, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects,
and the interaction of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects with the ﬁnancing deﬁcit. Note that we exclude the
level eﬀect of the ﬁnancing deﬁcit when including the interaction of the ﬁnancing deﬁcit with
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to avoid collinearity. Alternatively, we could exclude the ﬁxed eﬀect dummy
for one ﬁrm, but the coeﬃcient of ﬁnancing deﬁcit would then depend on the (arbitrary) choice
of which ﬁrm to exclude. Column 3 adds controls for CEO stock and option ownership, and
Column 4 adds year ﬁxed eﬀects. In Column 5, we add changes in sales, changes in Q, changes
in proﬁtability, and changes in tangibility and, in Column 6, the lag of book leverage.22
Among the controls, deviations from (within-ﬁrm) average book leverage are negatively
related to debt issues, consistent with leverage targeting. Above-average changes in Q predict
less ﬁnancing deﬁcit covered with debt, consistent, for example, with market timing. More
debt is used when CEOs have above average stock holdings, consistent with incentive eﬀects in
the presence of positive information (or overconﬁdence). Surprisingly, CEOs use signiﬁcantly
21Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) analyze large ﬁrms, with mean assets of $953m for the period 1971-1989.
(Our ﬁrms are even larger, with mean assets of $5477m for the period 1980-1994.) When Frank and Goyal
(2003) analyze, separately, the quartile of largest ﬁrms, they ﬁnd similar coeﬃcients of 0.753 for the period
1971-1989 and of 0.675 for the period 1990-1998.
22The results are nearly identical using lagged levels of the sales, tangibility, proﬁtability, and Q controls (as
in Section 5.1.1) rather than changes.
18less debt when their option holdings are higher than average, though the economic magnitude
is low (1-2c / less debt per $1 of ﬁnancing deﬁcit for a 1 standard deviation increase in option
holdings). In all speciﬁcations, Longholders use more debt than non-Longholder successors or
predecessors in the same ﬁrm. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and economically large,
ranging from 32c /t o3 5 c / more debt per $1 of ﬁnancing deﬁcit.
The results using the TOTALconﬁdent proxy are qualitatively similar, though weaker eco-
nomically and statistically. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the Pre- and Post- Long-
holder portions of the Longholder estimate and very little impact of Holder 67, perhaps due to
reduced sample size. We also re-estimate the regressions without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and their
interactions with the ﬁnancing deﬁcit. Using the TOTALconﬁdent measure, we ﬁnd stronger
results, both economically and statistically. Using Longholder, however, the interaction with
the ﬁnancing deﬁcit becomes insigniﬁcantly negative. This ﬁnding suggests that Longholder
CEOs are concentrated in ﬁrms which, during our sample period, use more equity than debt
to meet ﬁnancing needs and underscores the importance of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.23
5.2 Internal versus External Financing
Overconﬁdence not only predicts a preference for debt over equity, but also a preference for
internal versus external ﬁnance (Hypothesis 2). A possible consequence is debt conservatism:
Even though overconﬁdent CEOs prefer debt to equity, their ﬁrst choice is to forgo capital
markets altogether, resulting in debt levels lower than the rational benchmark.24
We use the “kink” variable of Graham (2000) to measure debt conservatism. The kink
captures how much ﬁrms could increase debt before the expected tax beneﬁt begins to decline.
Graham argues that ﬁrms, on average, leave money on the table by following excessively
conservative debt policies. We ask whether overconﬁdence explains a portion of the eﬀect.
Overconﬁdent CEOs may choose debt over equity when they access external markets (i.e.
23Our earlier ﬁndings show, however, that Longholder CEOs are less likely to issue equity, conditional on
doing a public issue. One potential explanation for why we ﬁnd this earlier result in a framework even without
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects is that Longholder CEOs may use less private debt ﬁnancing than other CEOs. It is also
possible that Longholder CEOs issue public equity to ﬁnance larger investments than other CEOs, reinforcing
the importance of controlling for ﬁnancing needs.
24Note that even with conservative debt policy, leverage of overconﬁdent CEOs may be higher than for rational
CEOs since overconﬁdent CEOs prefer to forgo equity issues entirely.
19conditional on having a positive ﬁnancing deﬁcit), yet not access those markets frequently
enough to take full advantage of the available tax beneﬁts of debt. We use the following
regression speciﬁcation:
Kinkit = β1 + β2∆it + X0
itB3 + Y 0
itB4 +  it, (6)
where ∆ is the overconﬁdence measure, X are ﬁrm level controls and Y CEO portfolio charac-
teristics. We include the ﬁrm controls from Graham’s original tobit analysis, to ease compari-
son. All standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. The null hypothesis is that β2 is zero;
overconﬁdence predicts β2 > 0. We also test whether overconﬁdent CEOs with high “kinks”
simultaneously raise equity as a substitute for debt (which would falsify the overconﬁdence
interpretation) and whether they have suﬃcient cash on hand to cover investment needs.
In Table 5, we present tobit estimates of (6) using Longholder for ∆.( T h ek i n ki sa r t i ﬁcially
bounded between 0 and 8.) Column 1 shows a baseline regression without controls, Column
2 adds CEO-level controls, and Column 3 adds the full set of ﬁrm-level controls and industry
dummies from Graham (2000).25 Among the controls, we ﬁnd some evidence that more vested
option holdings are associated with lower kinks. Of Graham’s 19 ﬁrm-level and industry
controls, 16 have qualitatively similar eﬀects in his and our estimations. The exceptions are
negative owners’ equity, the natural log of sales and advertising expense over sales, all of which
have opposite signs.26 Most importantly, Longholder CEOs have signiﬁcantly higher kinks
across speciﬁcations. The coeﬃcient estimates range from 0.605 to 1.256, representing a 15%
to 32% increase in kink from its mean and an increase of 0.24 to 0.46 standard deviations.
Overconﬁdence also predicts that the debt conservatism of Longholder CEOs reﬂects high
reliance on internal resources, rather than low internal and high equity ﬁnancing. As a ﬁrst
test of this prediction, we add an indicator for “Low Cash Status” and its interaction with
Longholder (Column 4). Low Cash Status is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm’s cash stock at the beginning
of the year, divided by mean industry investment, is at or below the 40th percentile in our
sample.27 Mean industry investment is calculated separately for each year and each Fama-
25Graham also includes squares of all continuous controls. Including the squares has little impact on the
results: The estimated Longholder coeﬃcient in Column 3 changes from 0.605 to 0.611 (p = 0.051).
26The (untabulated) control variables are statistically signiﬁcant with the exception of Negative Owners’
Equity, CYCLICAL, Quick Ratio, and PPE-to-Assets.
27The results are robust to using other cutoﬀs, such as the 25th or the 30th percentile, or alternative proxies
for “expected volume of investment,” such as prior-year averages.
20French industry shown in Panel A of Table 1. We ﬁnd no evidence of higher kinks among
Longholder CEOs with low internal funds. Only Longholder CEOs with abundant cash have
signiﬁcantly higher kinks than rational CEOs (coeﬃcient = 0.85, p = 0.025). While the
diﬀerence in kinks between Longholders with and without low cash is insigniﬁcant (p = 0.214),
the result conﬁrms that high kinks are not driven by CEOs who cannot use internal funds and
need to raise equity to ﬁnance investment. We measure equity issuance directly in Table 6.
One shortcoming of the tobit analysis is that we cannot include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects without
biasing the coeﬃcient estimates due to the incidental parameters problem. To address alter-
native explanations which rely on (uncontrolled) cross-sectional diﬀerences between ﬁrms with
and without Longholder CEOs, we replicate our ﬁndings in a logit framework, with kink > 1a s
the dependent variable (untabulated). Using conditional logit, we obtain consistent estimates
including ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation identiﬁes the Longholder eﬀect using only diﬀer-
ences in kink across Longholder and non-Longholder CEOs within the same ﬁrm. The results
are larger in economic magnitude though weaker statistically when including ﬁrm eﬀects, all
controls, Low Cash, and Low Cash interacted with Longholder (Longholder p = 0.116). The
Longholder coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% or 10% level using the four speciﬁcations from
Table 5 in the logit framework (i.e. without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects).
Overall, Longholders appear to use debt more conservatively than other CEOs, particularly
when cash reserves are abundant.
We also test directly whether Longholder CEOs do fewer equity issues as their ﬁrms’ kinks
increase, consistent with aversion to external ﬁnance and the overconﬁdence hypothesis. In
Table 6, we tabulate the distribution of net equity issues among Longholder CEOs, separately
f o rf o u rd i ﬀerent levels of “kink”: (i) kink ≤ 1, (ii) 1 < kink ≤ 3, (iii) 3 < kink ≤ 7, and (iv)
kink > 7. Comparing across groups, we ﬁnd that higher levels of kink are associated with less
equity issuance. As kink increases, both the mean and median of net equity issuance decline
monotonically. The diﬀerences in mean equity issues between groups (i) and (ii) and groups
(i) and (iii) have p-values of 0.016 and 0.052, respectively (clustering errors at the ﬁrm level).
The remaining cross-group diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Thus, Longholder CEOs who display debt conservatism are also less likely to issue equity.
Instead, they appear to rely more on internal ﬁnance. It is also possible that Longholder CEOs
store debt capacity in anticipation of large investments or acquisitions (thereby inducing high
21kinks). This explanation would be consistent with the evidence in Malmendier and Tate
(forthcoming)t h a to v e r c o n ﬁdent CEOs do more acquisitions and prefer to ﬁnance them with
cash and debt.
Finally, we analyze the relation between the credit-worthiness of ﬁrms and their kinks.
This analysis addresses two concerns. First, the high degree of debt conservatism among
overconﬁdent CEOs may simply reﬂect bad credit ratings. Second, if overconﬁdent CEOs
have particularly good ratings, high kinks might imply that they could issue additional, nearly
riskless debt.28 But overconﬁdent CEOs should not be reluctant to issue riskless debt, since
there is no disagreement about the appropriate price (interest rate). To test whether either
extreme of credit-worthiness is driving our results, we use the S&P Long-Term Domestic Issuer
Credit Rating to split the sample of ﬁrm years into thirds: ﬁrms with A+ ratings or better are
in the highest third and ﬁrms with BBB ratings or worse are in the lowest third. We drop ﬁrms
with missing credit ratings. Repeating the tobit analysis of Table 5 on each subsample, we ﬁnd
that the eﬀect is almost entirely concentrated in the middle third: the coeﬃcients and p-values
for Longholder in the Column III speciﬁcation are .489 (0.32), 0.823 (0.018), and 0.412 (0.178)
for low, middle, and high credit ratings. Thus, our ﬁndings neither reﬂect limited access to
debt markets nor a failure to raise riskless debt. They also conﬁrm that overconﬁdence cannot
explain why certain large, credit-worthy companies abstain from issuing debt entirely.
We ﬁnd similar results using Holder 67 as the proxy for ∆.W ea l s o ﬁnd little consistent
evidence of diﬀerences across the Pre- and Post-Longholder portions of the Longholder measure.
The results using the TOTALconﬁdent proxy, however, are quite diﬀerent. TOTALconﬁdent
CEOs appear to have lower kinks than other CEOs, though the result is not robust to the ﬁxed
eﬀects logit speciﬁcation. This result is not surprising given our ﬁnding in Table 2 that only
TOTALconﬁdent CEOs are associated with a signiﬁcantly higher probability of public debt
issuance. One possible interpretation for the diﬀerence in results is that the portfolio measures
identify a more extreme perception of undervaluation.
28Note, however, that kinks greater than 1 do not automatically imply spare riskless debt capacity since states
with negative earnings realizations result in no tax beneﬁts regardless of the interest level, shifting down both
the ﬂat and declining portions of the expected marginal beneﬁtc u r v e .
225.3 Leverage and the History of Managerial Beliefs
The results thus far conﬁrm Hypotheses 1 and 2: CEOs we classify as overconﬁdent prefer
debt to equity conditional on accessing external ﬁnance and prefer internal to external ﬁnance,
resulting in debt conservatism. In the last step of our analysis we ask whether these ﬁnancing
choices have a persistent impact on capital structure that can explain cross-sectional varia-
tion in corporate leverage. Since overconﬁdent CEOs prefer debt over equity conditional on
accessing external markets, more past (external) ﬁnancing decisions with overconﬁdent CEOs
in place may explain higher current leverage ratios.
Testing this relationship empirically is diﬃcult due to the impact of ﬁxed ﬁrm characteristics
on capital structure. For example, we saw in Section 5.1.2 that the cross-sectional correlation
of Longholder with the debt-ﬁnanced portion of ﬁnancing deﬁc i th a st h eo p p o s i t es i g no ft h e
within-ﬁrm correlation. Longholder CEOs disproportionately sort into ﬁrms that use more
equity in general. Thus, even though Longholders use less equity than their predecessors or
successors, their ﬁrms’ leverage may be lower in the cross-section. To avoid this confounding
eﬀect, we ﬁr s te x a m i n et h ei m p a c to fo v e r c o n ﬁdence on the cross-section of leverage using
the TOTALconﬁdent measure, for which the between- and within-ﬁrm eﬀects go the same
direction. We then return to the Longholder measure and try to address the sorting issue.29
To conduct our tests, we deﬁne external-ﬁnance weighted TOTALconﬁdent as the ﬁnancing-
deﬁcit weighted average of the TOTALconﬁdent variable, analogous to the external-ﬁnance
weighted average market-to-book ratio of Baker and Wurgler (2002). We replace the ﬁnancing
deﬁcit with 0 in years in which it is negative to constrain the weights to be positive and to
add to 1. The variable captures the fraction of total external ﬁnance the ﬁrm raised in years
in which we classify the CEO as overconﬁdent. We control for the external-ﬁnance weighted
average of the TOTALmentions variable and of Q. We also verify the robustness of the results
to alternative weighting schemes.30
We test whether ﬁrms with higher values of external-ﬁnance weighted TOTALconﬁdent (1)
increase their leverage more over the sample period and (2) have higher end-of-sample leverage.
29We cannot use Holder 67 since the sample selection (i.e. the requirement that CEOs have an option that is
at least 67% in the money with ﬁve years remaining duration) introduces gaps in the time series of ﬁrm-years.
30We consider the mean of TOTALconﬁdent conditional on a positive ﬁnancing deﬁcit, which measures the
fraction of years in which the CEO was overconﬁd e n ta n dr a i s e de x t e r n a lﬁnance, and the unconditional mean
of TOTALconﬁdent, which measures the fraction of all ﬁrm years with an overconﬁdent CEO.
23For this analysis, we deﬁne book leverage following Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Fama and
French (2002): assets (item 6) minus book equity divided by assets. The results are robust to
using our prior deﬁnition of book leverage and to using market, rather than book, leverage.
(For market leverage the denominator is assets plus market equity minus book equity. Book
and market equity are deﬁned in Section 3.) Given the purely cross sectional nature of the
regression, we need to adjust standard errors only for heteroskedasticity.
Table 7 presents the results. Column 1 shows a baseline regression of book leverage at the
end of the sample on the standard controls: within sample changes in proﬁtability, tangibility,
the logarithm of sales, and Q. We also control for book leverage at the beginning of the
sample. This speciﬁcation is equivalent to regressing the within-sample change in leverage on
the within-sample changes in the control variables. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms tend to decrease leverage
during our sample: end-of-sample leverage is roughly 60% of beginning-of-sample leverage.
An increase in the logarithm of sales during the sample predicts a decrease in leverage. In
Column 2, we add external-ﬁnance weighted TOTALconﬁdent and TOTALmentions to the
speciﬁcation. The eﬀect of weighted TOTALconﬁdent is positive and signiﬁcant, while general
press coverage (TOTALmentions) has no impact. The R2 of the regression increases by 0.04. In
Column 3, we add external-ﬁnance weighted market-to-book to the regression. As in Baker and
Wurgler (2002), this variable signiﬁcantly predicts lower leverage. The R2 improves by another
0.02. Finally we add the contemporaneous values of TOTALconﬁdent and TOTALmentions
in Column 4. These controls allow us to assess whether the explanatory power of the external-
ﬁnance weighted average comes from historical managerial beliefs or merely captures the eﬀect
of contemporaneous TOTALconﬁdent values. The weighted average remains positive, though
the statistical signiﬁcance is reduced to the 10% level.
In Columns 5 through 8, we focus on the level of, rather than changes in, leverage. In
Column 5, we estimate a baseline regression of end-of-sample leverage on levels of the stan-
dard controls from Column 1. We ﬁnd that less proﬁtable, larger ﬁrms with fewer tangible
assets have higher leverage. In Column 6, we add external-ﬁnance weighted TOTALconﬁdent
and TOTALmentions. Again, the coeﬃcient on weighted TOTALconﬁdent is positive and
signiﬁcant and the R2 of the regression increases. In the remaining columns we successively
add external-ﬁnance weighted Q, and the contemporaneous values of TOTALconﬁdent and
TOTALmentions as controls. In all cases external-ﬁnance weighted TOTALconﬁdent is posi-
24tive and signiﬁcant. Thus, having CEOs outsiders perceive as “conﬁdent” and “optimistic” in
place when the ﬁrm raises external ﬁnance appears to robustly predict increases in leverage
and higher end-of-sample leverage.
Next, we repeat the analysis using Longholder in place of TOTALconﬁdent. Replicating
Table 7, we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcantly negative eﬀect of external-ﬁnance weighted Longholder,
controlling for contemporaneous Longholder. The eﬀect is between one third to half the mag-
nitude of the TOTALconﬁdent eﬀect. Thus, the sorting of Longholder CEOs into ﬁrms that
use more equity dominates the preference of Longholders for debt over equity in the cross-
section. It is possible that the clustering of Longholder CEOs into low-leverage ﬁrms arises
endogenously. In a dynamic overconﬁdence model, Longholder CEOs may, over time, exhaust
the ﬁrm’s debt capacity without losing their desire to undertake (excessive) investment. To
allow for the possibility of non-monotonic Longholder eﬀects, we re-estimate the regressions
of Table 7 separately for ﬁrms with no Longholder years, with fewer than 5 Longholder years,
with 5 to 7 Longholder years, and with more than 7 Longholder years — rather than including
the weighted average Longholder variable. The results are broadly consistent with the dynamic
endogeneity interpretation. Firms with 5 to 7 Longholder years have marginally signiﬁcant in-
creases in book leverage relative to ﬁrms without Longholder CEOs (the coeﬃcient estimates
in Columns (2) - (4) range from 0.095 to 0.099). They also have higher end-of-sample leverage,
though the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Firms with more than 7 Longholder years,
on the other hand, have signiﬁcant decreases in leverage relative to ﬁrms without Longholders
and lower end-of-sample leverage ratios. Replicating this analysis with TOTALconﬁdent we
ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the measures indeed comes from ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n7o v e r -
conﬁdent sample years. Using TOTALconﬁdent, the eﬀect on leverage is positive for all three
intervals.
Overall, the results are consistent with an impact of past managerial beliefs on current
capital structure. Given the short time series and sorting eﬀects, however, the results are
sensitive to the choice of overconﬁdence measure.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Traditional analyses in corporate ﬁnance relate ﬁnancial policies to market-, industry-, and
ﬁrm-level determinants. This paper illustrates that our understanding of capital structure
25decisions may be improved by accounting for managerial characteristics. Our analysis focuses
on managerial overconﬁdence, i.e. overestimation of future cash ﬂows. Overconﬁdent CEOs
perceive external ﬁnancing to be too costly, particularly equity ﬁnancing. Thus, they prefer
debt over equity, conditional on raising risky capital, but access the external market with low
frequency overall.
We test these predictions empirically, using two measures of managerial beliefs. First, we
use data on personal portfolio decisions of the CEO: If a CEO holds options beyond calibrated
thresholds for early exercise, we classify him as overconﬁdent. Second, we measure the outside
perception of CEOs using portrayal in the business press.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that, conditional on accessing public securities markets, overcon-
ﬁdent CEOs are less likely to issue equity than other CEOs. We also ﬁnd that, to cover an
additional dollar of external ﬁnancing deﬁcit, overconﬁdent CEOs issue about 33 cents more
debt than their peers. Managerial overconﬁdence is also positively related to debt conservatism.
This debt conservatism is not driven by an increased propensity to issue equity; instead, over-
conﬁdent CEOs rely excessively on internal funds. Finally, we ﬁnd some evidence that the
preference for debt over equity leads to longer-term increases in leverage for ﬁrms that have
overconﬁdent managers in place when external ﬁnance is raised.
These results have distinct implications for contracting practices and organizational design.
Standard incentives, such as stock- and option-based compensation, are unlikely to mitigate
the eﬀects of managerial overconﬁdence on investment and ﬁnancing decisions. As a result,
the board of directors may need to use diﬀerent tools, such as cash dividend payment and debt
overhang, to constrain overconﬁdent CEOs.
267A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .The result follows from a simple relabeling of the variables in Lemma
1 of Malmendier and Tate (2004): b V = ˆ E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + b A + C − c; V = E[ ˜ R −
τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + A + C − c; b VA = b A + C; VA = A + C;a n dVT = I. The relation is weak
because rational CEOs are indiﬀerent among all ﬁnancing plans while overconﬁdent CEOs
strictly prefer internal ﬁnance.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .For notational simplicity, deﬁne Q ≡ E[( ˜ R−τ1{R>I}( ˜ R−I−[w−d])−
w)+]. Using the participation constraint for shareholders (2) and the fact that E[·]= ˆ E[·]f o r
rational CEOs, we can re-write the maximand as Q − (I − d).
We consider separately the case in which the CEO uses at least some risky debt (w>d>
RB) and the case in which the CEO uses no risky debt, w = d = RB. The latter case is the
lower boundary of (4).
In the ﬁrst case, i.e. if w>R B,t h eﬁrm defaults in the bad state and hence
Q =( 1 − τ)pRG + pτI − (1 − τ)pw − pτd (7)
⇐⇒ Q − (I − d)=( 1 − τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I − (1 − τ)pw +( 1− pτ)d.
Using (3) to substitute for w, the maximand becomes:
Q − (I − d)=( 1− τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I +( 1− τ)(1 − p)(RB − L)+τ(1 − p)d. (8)
Since d enters positively, value is maximized by setting d as high as possible. Thus, given
boundary (4), the optimal level of debt is d∗ = I. Substituting back into the maximand yields
Q − (I − d∗)=( 1− τ)[pRG +( 1− p)(RB − L) − I].
In the second case, w = RB,t h eﬁrm uses only riskless debt and equity. Thus, there is no
default, and we have:
Q =( 1 − τ)pRG + pτI +( 1− p)RB − d (9)
⇐⇒ Q − (I − d)=( 1 − τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I +( 1− p)RB (10)
Comparing the value function at the two boundaries, we ﬁnd that the manager will choose
full debt ﬁnancing if:
(1 − τ)[pRG +( 1− p)(RB − L) − I] > (1 − τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I +( 1− p)RB, (11)
27which simpliﬁes to
τ(I−RB)
1−τ >L . For the reverse inequality, the manager will choose full equity
ﬁnancing, and he is indiﬀerent in the case of equality. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let Q ≡ E[( ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I − [w − d]) − w)+]. Denote as b Q an
overconﬁdent manager’s perception of Q. Then, b Q = Q + p(1 − τ)∆. Using (2), we can write
the objective function of the overconﬁdent CEO’s maximization problem as [Q − (I − d)] b Q
Q.
Consider ﬁrst the case that the CEO uses at least some risky debt (w>d>R B). Then,
using equations (7) and (8) and constraint (3), the maximand becomes
[Q − (I − d)]
b Q
Q










(1 − τ)pRG + pτI − (1 − τ)[d − (1 − p)(RB − L)] − pτd
¸








= τ(1 − p)+
τ(1 − p)p(1 − τ)∆
Q
+
p(1 − τ)∆[(1 − τ)+pτ]
Q2 [Q − (I − d)].
The derivative is strictly positive if Q>0 (and hence Q − (I − d)=s/(s + s0)Q>0).
We know that Q ≥ 0 since it is deﬁned as the expectation over values truncated at 0 (Q ≡
E[( ˜ R−τ1{R>I}( ˜ R−I −[w−d])−w)+]). Since Q = p[(1−τ)(RG−w)+τ(I −d)] in the case of
risky debt by (7), RG − w ≥ 0( w>R G yields lower payoﬀs to bondholders and stockholders
than w = RG due to default costs in both states), and I − d ≥ 0b y( 4 ) ,Q =0i fa n do n l yi f
RG −w =0a n dI −d = 0. Thus, we have either Q>0, in which case the derivative is strictly
positive and the manager sets d as high as possible, d∗ = I,o rQ = 0, which occurs also for
d = I. In either case, the maximand becomes:
[Q − (I − d)]
b Q
Q
= b Q =( 1− τ)[pRG +( 1− p)(RB − L) − I]+p(1 − τ)∆
Now consider the case that w = d = RB. Then, the ﬁrm ﬁnances I using only riskless debt
and equity. There is no default and using (9) and (10) the maximand becomes
[Q − (I − d)]
b Q
Q










(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − RB + pτI
¸
28Comparing the values of the objective function using the optimal amount of risky debt and
all equity, we ﬁnd that the manager chooses risky debt ﬁnancing if and only if





(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − RB + pτI
¸







(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − I + pτI
(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − RB + pτI
¸¾
> (1−τ)(1−p)L
Comparing this condition to condition (11) in Proposition 1, we see that the overconﬁdent
CEO will be more likely to use debt if and only if the term in {}is positive. Since I>R B by
assumption, the term in [ ] is positive, yielding the result. Q.E.D.
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33Figure 1. Model Predictions (Stylized Example)
The hypothetical example illustrates how overconfident CEOs deviate from the rational benchmark in their
average financing of investment projects, as predicted by the theory. Relative to the (hypothetical) rational
benchmark of 1/3 cash, 1/3 debt, and 1/3 equity financing, overconfident CEOs choose a lower absolute amount


















Rational CEO Overconfident CEO
Equity Financing
Debt Financing
Cash FinancingPanel A.  Financing Deficit Variables
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Assets ($m) 2385 5476.92 13389.44 39.64 198598.70 463 4820.30 2111.78 8763.07 48.79 79262.00
Net Financing Deficit ($m) 2385 42.67 538.56 -6800.30 8845.50 463 10.41 -1.05 287.07 -845.00 1698.00
Cash Dividends ($m) 2385 109.47 239.77 0.00 2487.00 463 126.59 40.69 252.09 0.00 1870.00
Net Investment ($m) 2385 502.28 1311.81 -2930.00 26523.00 463 498.57 207.37 1070.84 -577.00 9755.00
Change in Working Capital ($m) 2385 26.73 790.77 -21767.00 16224.00 463 35.54 17.95 347.04 -2920.50 2675.00
Cash Flow after Interest and Taxes ($m) 2385 595.80 1276.57 -1678.44 20278.00 463 650.29 254.62 1243.20 -1678.44 11273.00
Net Financing Deficit/Assetst-1 2385 0.03 0.16 -0.63 2.56 463 0.02 0.00 0.14 -0.24 1.60
Net Debt Issues/Assetst-1 2385 0.01 0.08 -0.62 0.92 463 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.15 0.36
Net Equity Issues/Assetst-1 2155 0.00 0.08 -0.77 1.85 413 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.30 1.18
Profitability 2385 0.18 0.11 -0.24 0.99 463 0.21 0.19 0.12 -0.03 0.88
∆ Profitability 2385 0.00 0.06 -0.76 0.98 463 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.51 0.98
Tangibility 2385 0.44 0.22 0.00 2.08 463 0.46 0.43 0.21 0.06 2.08
∆ Tangibility 2385 -0.05 0.11 -1.47 0.54 463 -0.05 -0.03 0.12 -1.47 0.16
Q 2385 1.61 1.01 0.59 12.26 463 1.70 1.44 1.02 0.77 10.71
∆ Q 2385 0.01 0.50 -7.18 5.04 463 0.03 0.02 0.42 -1.81 4.32
ln(Sales) 2385 7.90 1.12 3.18 11.93 463 7.89 7.87 1.18 3.18 11.23
∆ ln(Sales) 2385 0.08 0.19 -2.04 1.67 463 0.09 0.08 0.17 -0.55 1.67
0.13 0.06 0.11 0.02
0.05 n/a 0.03 n/a
0.18 0.14 0.16 0.14
0.04 0.06 0.00 0.09
0.08 n/a 0.16 n/a
0.09 0.18 0.13 0.17
Money 
Business Equipment 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Full Sample Longholder Sample
Number of Firms = 263 Number of Firms = 56
Net financing deficit is cash dividends plus net investment plus change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes. Net investment is capital expenditures plus increase in investments plus acquisitions plus other uses of
funds minus sale of property, plants, and equipment minus sale of investment. Change in working capital is change in operating working capital plus change in cash and cash equivalents plus change in current debt. Cash flow after
interest and taxes is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization plus extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus deferred taxes plus equity in net loss (earnings) plus other funds from operations
plus gain (loss) from sales of property, plants, and equipment and other investments. Net debt issues are long term debt issuance minus long term debt reduction. Net equity issues are sales of common stock minus stock repurchases.
Profitability is operating income before depreciation, normalized by assets at the beginning of the year. Tangibility is property, plants, and equipment, normalized by assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets
over the book value of assets, where market value of assets is the book value of assets plus market equity minus book equity.  ∆ denotes one-year changes.
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year.Panel B.  Kink Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Kink 1726 3.93 3 2.74 0 8 377 4.59 4 2.75 0 8
I(No dividend) 1726 0.12 0 0.33 0 1 377 0.17 0 0.38 0 1
I(Negative owners' equity) 1726 0.01 0 0.12 0 1 377 00000
I(NOL carryforward) 1726 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 377 0.14 0 0.35 0 1
ECOST 1726 1.74 0.65 3.21 0 18.92 377 2.36 0.79 3.92 0 18.92
CYCLICAL 1726 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.18 377 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.18
Return on assets 1726 0.11 0.11 0.06 -0.11 0.26 377 0.12 0.12 0.06 -0.11 0.26
ln(sales) 1726 7.88 7.82 1.01 5.49 10.32 377 7.93 7.87 1.07 5.49 10.32
Z-score 1726 2.51 2.34 1.17 0.38 7.07 377 2.74 2.51 1.24 0.79 7.07
Quick ratio 1726 1.08 0.89 0.74 0.16 4.92 377 1.12 0.94 0.71 0.16 4.92
Current ratio 1726 1.88 1.63 0.96 0.57 6.02 377 1.97 1.71 0.94 0.58 6.02
PPE-to-assets 1726 0.42 0.40 0.18 0.06 0.81 377 0.41 0.39 0.16 0.06 0.81
Q-ratio 1726 1.12 0.88 0.78 0.15 4.58 377 1.22 0.99 0.83 0.15 4.58
R&D-to-sales 1726 0.02 0.01 0.03 0 0.16 377 0.03 0.02 0.04 0 0.16
Advertising-to-sales 1726 0.02 0 0.03 0 0.16 377 0.02 0.01 0.03 0 0.16
Computer Industry 1726 0.04 0 0.19 0 1 377 0.07 0 0.25 0 1
Semiconductor Industry 1726 0.02 0 0.14 0 1 377 0.03 0 0.16 0 1
Chemicals and Allied Products Industry 1726 0.14 0 0.35 0 1 377 0.21 0 0.41 0 1
Aircraft and Guided Space Vehicles Industry 1726 0.02 0 0.13 0 1 377 0.02 0 0.14 0 1
Other Sensitive Industries 1726 0.19 0 0.39 0 1 377 0.15 0 0.35 0 1
Panel C.  CEO Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Age 2384 57.77 58 7.16 32 84 463 58.46 59 6.30 41 82
Tenure 2364 8.83 6 7.69 1 45 442 10.78 9 6.78 1 36
CEO Stock Ownership 2385 0.03 0.00 0.08 0 0.95 463 0.02 0.00 0.04 0 0.49
CEO Vested Options 2385 0.03 0.01 0.14 0 4.63 463 0.07 0.02 0.29 0 4.63
Number of CEOs = 498 Number of CEOs = 58
CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a percentage of common shares outstanding and multiplied by 10 (so that
the mean is roughly comparable to CEO Stock Ownership).
Full Sample Longholder Sample
Table 1 (cont.)
Number of Firms = 189
Kink is the amount of interest at the point where the marginal benefit function becomes downward sloping, as a proportion of actual interest expense. ECOST is the standard deviation of the first
difference in taxable earnings divided by assets, the quoteient times the sum of advertising, research, and development expenses divided by sales. CYCLICAL is the standard deviation of operating
earnings divided by mean assets first calculated for each firm, then averaged across firms within two-digit SIC codes. Return on assets is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation, divided
by assets. Z-score is 3.3 times the difference of operating income before depreciation and depreciation plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital (balance sheet), the
quantity divided by assets. Quick ratio is the sum of cash and short-term investments and total receivables divided by total current liabilities. Current ratio is total current assets divided by total
current liabilities. Q-ratio is preferred stock plus market value of common equity plus net short-term liabilities, the quantity divided by assets. R&D to sales and Advertising to sales are set to 0 when
the numerator is missing.  
Computer Industry are all firms with SIC code 357, Semiconductor Industry all firms with SIC code 367, Chemicals and Allied Products comprises SIC codes 280-289, Aircraft and Guided Space
Vehicles SIC codes 372 and 376, and Other Sensitive Industries SIC codes 340-400, excluding 357, 367, 372, and 376. Vested options (as a % of shares outstanding) are multiplied by 10 so that the
means of vested options and stock ownership are the same order of magnitude. Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package
until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year.  
Full Sample Longholder Sample
Number of Firms = 44Years with a 
Security Issue




% of Issue 
Years with a 
Debt Issue
% of Issue 




Longholder = 0 621 42% 57% 16%
Longholder = 1 141 31% 63% 19%
Pre-Longholder = 1 91 31% 63% 23%
Post-Longholder = 1 50 32% 64% 12%
Difference t (Longholder = 0 - Longholder = 1) 2.03** 0.85 0.85
Holder 67 = 0 95 39% 65% 21%
Holder 67 = 1 182 23% 73% 16%
Difference t 3.12*** 1.18 1.04
TOTALconfident = 0 452 48% 47% 18%
TOTALconfident = 1 214 25% 79% 14%
Difference t 5.37*** 6.77*** 1.43
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2.  Public Security Issues
Longholder is a binary variable, equal to 1 if the CEO, at some point during his tenure, held an option package until the last year before
expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. Post-Longholder is a dummy, equal to 1 for all
CEO-years after the CEO for the first time holds options to expiration. Pre-Longholder is Longholder minus Post-Longholder. Holder 67
is a dummy equal to 1 for all CEO years after the CEO for the first time fails to exercise a 67% in the money option with 5 years
remaining duration. In the Holder 67 regressions, the sample is limited to CEO years after the CEO for the first time had a 67% in the
money option with 5 years remaining duration. TOTALconfident is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the number of "confident" and
"optimistic" mentions for a CEO in the LexisNexis and Wall Street Journal searches exceeds the number of "not confident", "not
optimistic", and "reliable, cautious, practical, conservative, steady, frugal" mentions. TOTALmentions is the total number of articles
mentioning the CEO in both sets of searches.  Both dummies consider all articles over the sample period up to the previous year.
Data on public issues is from the SDC. There are 330 firms. Equity issues are issues of common stock or non-convertible preferred
stock. Debt issues are issues of non-convertible debt. Hybrid issues are issues of convertible debt or convertible preferred stock. US
Rule 144A issues are included.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Longholder -0.469 -0.592 -0.534 -0.46 -0.457
(1.94)* (2.34)** (2.10)** (1.80)* (1.66)*
CEO Stock Ownership -0.266 -0.996 -1.279 -0.655
(0.16) (0.59) (0.72) (0.34)
CEO Vested Options 6.766 4.669 4.234 7.328
(3.43)*** (2.21)** (2.14)** (3.05)***
ln(Sales) -0.414 -0.437 -0.355
(3.79)*** (3.70)*** (2.84)***
Q -0.088 -0.074 0.139
(0.68) (0.56) (1.00)
Profitability -1.872 -1.493 -2.463
(1.53) (1.21) (1.74)*
Tangibility 0.139 0.088 0.113
(0.30) (0.19) (0.23)
Book Leverage 0.651 1.288
(1.14) (2.07)**
Year Fixed Effects X
Observations 762 644 627 617 617
Number of Firms 330 174 171 171 171
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.  Debt vs. Equity (I): Equity Issuance Logits
The sample consists of all firm years in which the firm did at least one public security issue. The dependent variable is binary
and equals 1 if the firm issued equity during the fiscal year, where equity issues are SDC issues of common equity or non-
convertible preferred stock. CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the
beginning of the year, as a percentage of common shares outstanding and multiplied by 10 (so that the mean is roughly
comparable to CEO Stock Ownership). Profitability is operating income before depreciation normalized by beginning of the
year assets. Tangibility is property, plants, and equipment, normalized by beginning of the year assets. Q is the market value
of assets over the book value of assets, where market value of assets is the book value of total assets plus market equity minus
book equity. Book leverage is the sum of debt in current liabilities and long term debt divided by the sum of the numerator
and common equity.  We exclude observations in which book leverage is negative or greater than 1.  
Stock, Vested Options, ln(Sales), Q, Profitability, Tangibility, and Book Leverage are measured at the beginning of the fiscal
year. Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package
until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. All
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Financing Deficit (FD) 0.729
(9.90)***
Longholder -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005
(1.43) (1.37) (1.95)* (2.03)** (1.43)
Longholder * FD 0.350 0.348 0.332 0.322 0.334
(1.78)* (1.77)* (1.77)* (1.69)* (1.90)*
CEO Stock Ownership 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.010
(0.87) (0.90) (0.85) (0.76)
CEO Stock * FD 0.373 0.431 0.370 0.348
(2.30)** (2.63)*** (2.14)** (2.17)**
CEO Vested Options -0.025 -0.021 0.000 0.011
(1.49) (1.15) (0.00) (0.52)
CEO Vested Options * FD -0.088 -0.098 -0.135 -0.156
(3.21)*** (3.59)*** (3.06)*** (3.76)***
Book Leverage -0.096
(5.98)***
Book Leverage * FD -0.129
(0.54)
FD Control Variables XX
FD Control Variables * FD XX
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Firm Fixed Effects XXXXX
Firm Fixed Effects * FD XXXXX
Observations 2385 2385 2385 2385 2385 2346
Number of Firms 263 263 263 263 263 262
R-squared 0.75 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4. Debt vs. Equity (II): Financing Deficit Regressions
The dependent variable is Net Debt Issues normalized by beginning-of-the-yearassets, where Net Debt Issues are long-term debt issues minus long term debt reduction. Net
Financing Deficit is cash dividends plus net investment plus change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes, normalized by beginning-of-the-yearassets.
Net investment is capital expenditures plus increase in investments plus acquisitions plus other uses of funds minus sale of PPE minus sale of investment. Change in
working capital is change in operating working capital plus change in cash and cash equivalents plus change in current debt. Cash flow after interest and taxes is income
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization plus extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus deferred taxes plus equity in net loss (earnings)
plus other funds from operations plus gain (loss) from sales of PPE and other investments. Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point
during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. 
CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a percentage of common shares outstanding
and multiplied by 10 (making the mean roughly comparable to CEO Stock Ownership). The FD Control Variables are identical to those in Frank and Goyal (2003): changes
in profitability (operating income before depreciation normalized by beginning of the year assets), in tangibility (property, plants, and equipment, normalized by beginning
of the year assets), in the logarithm of sales and in Q (market value of assets over the book value of assets, where market value of assets is the book value of total assets
plus market equity minus book equity). Book Leverage is debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by the debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt plus
common equity, measured at the beginning of the year. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longholder 1.122 1.256 0.605 0.852
(1.75)* (1.94)* (1.72)* (2.25)**
CEO Stock Ownership 3.369 -1.049 -0.956
(1.01) (0.47) (0.43)
CEO Vested Options -3.025 -3.170 -2.974
(0.70) (2.05)** (1.91)*
Low Cash Status -0.123
(0.59)
Longholder * (Low Cash Status) -0.654
(1.24)
Kink Controls XX
Industry Fixed Effects X X
Observations 1726 1726 1726 1725
Number of Firms 189 189 189 189
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5. Debt Conservatism: Kink Tobits
The dependent variable is the "kink" variable of Graham (2000). Kink is the amount of interest at which the marginal benefit function starts to slope down,
as a proportion of actual interest expense. Longholder is a binary variable, equal to 1 if the CEO, at some point during his tenure, held an option package
until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. CEO Stock Ownership is the percentage
of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that
are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a percentage of common shares outstanding and multiplied by 10 (so that the mean is
roughly comparable to CEO Stock Ownership).
Kink Controls are defined as in Graham (2002) and include dummies for No Dividend, Negative Owners' Equity, and NOL Carryforward, where NOL
means net operating loss; ECOST (the product of (1) the standard deviation of the first difference in taxable earnings divided by assets and (2) the sum of
advertising, research, and development expenses divided bysales); CYCLICAL (the standard deviation of operating earnings divided by mean assets first
calculated for each firm, then averaged for each two-digit SIC code); Return on Assets (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation, dividedb y
assets); Z-Score (3.3 times the difference of operating income before depreciation and depreciation plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times 
working capital [balance sheet], divided by assets); Quick Ratio (sum of cash and short-term investments and total receivables divided by total current
liabilities); Current Ratio (total current assets, divided by total current liabilities); Q-Ratio (preferred stock plus market value of common equity plus net
short-term liabilities, divided by assets); R&D-to-Sales and Advertising-to-Sales. The final two variables are set to 0 when the numerator is missing.
Industry Fixed Effects are the kink-regression industry dummies of Graham (2000); see Table 1, Panel B. Low Cash Status is a dummy variable, equal to 1
if the firm's cash stock at the beginning of the year, divided by mean industry investment, is at or below the 40th percentile in our sample. Mean industry
investment is calculated separately for each year and each of 12 Fama-French industry groups. (See Table 1, Panel A.) All standard errors are adjusted for
clustering at the firm level. The tobit regressions account for two-sided censoring of the kink variable at 0 and 8.Kink ≤ 1 1 < Kink ≤ 3 3 < Kink ≤ 7 Kink > 7
10th percentile -0.00834 -0.02923 -0.02668 -0.05162
25th percentile 0.00000 -0.00003 -0.01055 -0.01286
50th percentile 0.00544 0.00180 0.00000 0.00000
75th percentile 0.04148 0.00629 0.00348 0.00794
90th percentile 0.09536 0.01733 0.02928 0.01685
Observations 37 110 111 96
Mean 0.02869 0.00600 0.00497 0.00352
Standard Deviation 0.06086 0.05291 0.08199 0.09174
Table 6. Distribution of Longholder Net Equity Issues by Kink
The sample is all firm years in which Longholder equals 1. Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies
that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration,
provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. Kink (Graham (2000)) is the
amount of interest at the point where the marginal benefit function becomes downward sloping, as a
proportion of actual interest expense. Net equity issues are sales of common stock minus stock repurchases
and are normalized by beginning of the year assets.OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
External Finance Weighted Average TOTALconfident 0.152 0.150 0.101 0.092 0.107 0.11
(2.91)*** (2.91)*** (1.71)* (1.87)* (2.19)** (2.07)**
External Finance Weighted Average TOTALmentions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.02) (0.19) (0.37) (0.56) (0.62) (0.30)
External Finance Weighted Average Q -0.058 -0.055 -0.063 -0.062





∆t=0,T-1 Profitability -0.003 0.008 -0.057 -0.054
(0.05) (0.14) (0.87) (0.83)
∆t=0,T-1 Tangibility -0.081 -0.091 -0.076 -0.080
(1.11) (1.28) (1.02) (1.08)
∆t=0,T-1 ln(Sales) -0.043 -0.047 -0.018 -0.017
(2.82)*** (3.17)*** (1.01) (0.98)
∆t=0,T-1 Q 0.003 0.004 0.032 0.031
(0.24) (0.34) (1.88)* (1.90)*
Book Leveraget=1 0.622 0.603 0.550 0.576
(6.62)*** (6.12)*** (5.82)*** (5.79)***
Profitabilityt=T-1 -0.676 -0.639 -0.586 -0.582
(1.99)** (1.92)* (1.79)* (1.77)*
Tangibilityt=T-1 -0.030 -0.027 -0.042 -0.038
(0.46) (0.42) (0.66) (0.60)
Qt=T-1 -0.003 -0.006 0.029 0.028
(0.10) (0.22) (1.13) (1.12)
ln(Sales)t=T-1 0.065 0.053 0.047 0.046
(5.88)*** (4.06)*** (3.70)*** (3.75)***
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.25
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Leverage and the History of Managerial Beliefs
For each firm, year 0 refers to the first year it appears in our sample and year T to the last. The dependent variable is book leveragein year T, where book leverageis the difference between assets
and book equity divided by assets. Profitability is operating income before depreciation normalized by beginning of the year assets. Tangibility is property, plants, and equipment, normalized by
beginning of the year assets. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets, where market value of assets is the book value of total assets plust market equity minus book equity. ∆
denotes changes, where the subscripts denotes the first and last year of the difference, respectively. TOTALconfident is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the number of "confident" and
"optimistic" mentions for a CEO in the LexisNexis and Wall Street Journal searches exceeds the number of "not confident", "not optimistic", and "reliable, cautious, practical, conservative,
steady, frugal" mentions. TOTALmentions is the total number of articles mentioning the CEO in both sets of searches. Both dummies consider all articles over the sample period up to the
previous year. External finance weighted average Q is the average of Q between years 0 and T-1, weighted by the financing deficit.  
Similarly, external finance weighted average TOTALconfident is the average of TOTALconfident between years 0 and T-1, weighted by the financing deficit and external finance weighted
average TOTALmentions is the weighted average of TOTALmentions over the same time period. In all cases, negative financing deficits are set to 0 in constructing the weights. 